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Implicit lexical knowledge 
Ewa Dąbrowska, Northumbria University 
 
There is a broad consensus that native speakers’ knowledge of the grammatical 
system of their language is predominantly implicit, i.e., unconscious and acquired 
incidentally rather than intentionally. Word meaning, in contrast, is regarded as the 
paradigm case of explicit, or declarative, knowledge (although some aspects of 
lexical knowledge, e.g. collocations and grammatical features, may be implicit). This 
paper presents evidence that knowledge of word meanings can also be implicit. 63 
undergraduate students were given a self-evaluation task in which they were asked to 
assess their own knowledge of low frequency words, followed by a multiple-choice 
test providing an objective measure of their knowledge of the same words; they were 
asked to guess if they did not know the meaning of a word. Results indicate that even 
when participants claimed to be guessing, their performance was significantly above 
chance, indicating the existence of implicit knowledge by the guessing criterion 
(Dienes 2008).   
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years we have seen a large body of research on the role of explicit and 
implicit knowledge in language acquisition and processing (see, for example, 
Cleeremans 2006; DeKeyser 2003; Ellis 2011; Ellis et al. 2009; Paradis 2009; 
Perruchet 2008; Reber 1993; Rebuschat and Williams 2012l; Saffran 2003; Shanks 
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2005; Williams 2009). Explicit, or declarative knowledge – knowledge of events and 
facts (e.g., “World War II broke out in 1939”, “Paris is the capital of France”, “A cat 
is an animal”) – is conscious, and is usually acquired intentionally. Implicit, or 
nondeclarative knowledge, in contrast, is unconscious and acquired incidentally (i.e., 
passively, without attempting learn);1 examples involve motor skills (e.g., how to ride 
a bicycle), priming, and basic associative learning.  
While the distinction between the two types of knowledge is clear in principle, 
in practice it is very difficult to determine whether a particular aspect of a speakers’ 
performance depends on implicit or explicit knowledge (Dienes 2008; Ellis et al. 
2009; Rebuschat 2013). Several different criteria have been proposed to distinguish 
between these two types of knowledge (see Rebuschat 2013 for a comprehensive 
discussion). One widely used measure is verbal report: knowledge is considered 
implicit if participants perform above chance but are unable to explain their responses 
verbally. It is acknowledged, however, that verbal report is not a very reliable 
criterion, as participants may be unwilling to verbalize knowledge that they are 
uncertain about, or unable to verbalize it because they lack the requisite linguistic 
skills. The latter point is rather obvious for grammatical knowledge (to formulate a 
grammatical rule, one often needs specialized metalanguage – words like verb, 
person, number, agree, etc. – which many speakers do not know), but it is also true 
for vocabulary (some words are notoriously difficult to define). 
A more refined criterion involves comparison of performance on direct and 
indirect tests. Direct tests, as the name suggests, measure knowledge directly by 
requiring participants to perform a task which requires a particular kind of knowledge. 
                                                 
1
 Note that implicit/nondeclarative knowledge comprises several distinct systems 
subserved by different brains systems: procedural knowledge (i.e., skills and habits), 
priming and perceptual learning, classical conditioning, and nonassociative learning  
(see Squire 2004). 
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Indirect tests, in contrast, measure the extent to which performance on some 
seemingly unrelated task is facilitated as knowledge is acquired. Knowledge is 
considered to be implicit if an indirect test shows learning while a direct test does not. 
For instance, in a sequence learning experiment, implicit knowledge may be revealed 
through decreasing reaction times in copying a sequence, even when participants are 
unable to reproduce the sequence themselves and are unaware that the stimuli are 
ordered in a particular way. One problem with this criterion is that differences in 
performance on direct and indirect tests may be due simply to task demands: direct 
tests are typically considerably more difficult than indirect tests. Furthermore, 
performance on direct tests may be contaminated by implicit knowledge, leading the 
researcher to overestimate explicit learning.  
 Finally, it is possible to measure implicit knowledge by comparing 
participants’ confidence in their responses with their accuracy. Knowledge is 
considered to be implicit when participants believe they are guessing when their 
performance is actually above chance or if accuracy is unrelated to confidence: these 
are referred to as the guessing criterion and zero correlation criterion respectively 
(see Dienes et al. 1995; Dienes 2008). Although such subjective measures are not as 
widely used as verbal report, there is evidence that they are more sensitive and more 
reliable (see Dienes 2008; Dienes and Scott 2005; Hamrick and Rebuschat 2012; 
Rebuschat and Williams 2009, 2012; Ziori and Dienes 2006).  
 It is important to note that the presence of explicit knowledge does not rule out 
the presence of implicit knowledge, and vice versa. Thus, it is perfectly possible – and 
indeed quite common (Dienes 2008) – for a person to perform above chance on those 
test items on which they believe they are guessing (which demonstrates implicit 
knowledge according to the guessing criterion) and also to perform significantly 
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better on those items which they are more confident about (thus demonstrating 
explicit knowledge by the zero correlation criterion). In such cases, we conclude that 
the two types of knowledge co-exist in the same person. I will return to this issue in 
the concluding section.  
 Speakers’ knowledge of their native language is largely implicit (Ellis 2011). 
Speakers are able to understand and produce grammatical sentences like The cat is 
sitting on the mat, and distinguish them from ungrammatical strings such as *The cat 
on mat are sit without being consciously aware of the grammatical rules involved 
(e.g. the subject the cat is singular and therefore requires a singular form of the 
auxiliary; the progressive is formed by combining the appropriate form of the 
auxiliary be and a lexical verb with the -ing suffix; in an affirmative sentence, the first 
auxiliary comes after the subject but before adjuncts and complements, etc.)  
There is, however, an important exception, namely, lexical knowledge, and 
more specifically, knowledge of a word’s meaning. Although some aspects of lexical 
knowledge, such as knowledge about grammatical properties of words (Paradis 2009: 
14ff) and their typical collocations (Ellis 2004) may be implicit, knowledge of word 
meaning is clearly explicit: native speakers not only know what words like cat or sit 
mean; they also know that they know, and are able to provide a rough definition. In 
fact, it is difficult to imagine how word meaning could be implicit. Words are used to 
communicate ideas. They can do this because their meanings are shared by members 
of a particular speech community. If speakers weren’t consciously aware of the 
meanings they encoded, and listeners of the meanings they decoded, communication 
could not take place.  
There is some evidence from earlier research that speakers may have implicit 
representations of word meanings, at least in the early stages of acquisition. Hamrick 
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and Rebuschat (2012, 2014) studied the acquisition of picture and label pairings using 
a cross-situational learning paradigm. Participants were presented with pairs of 
pictures and pairs of pseudoword labels. The order of the pseudowords was not 
related to the order of the pictures: thus, when participants heard a pseudoword, they 
did not know which of the two pictures it was associated with. Half of the participants 
were in the intentional learning condition (they were asked to learn the meanings of 
the words and told they would be tested afterwards), while the other half were in the 
incidental learning condition (they were asked to say how many objects on each slide 
were animate, then given a surprise test). After training, participants were given a 
four-alternative multiple choice test. Both groups performed significantly above 
chance, and the intentional learning group performed significantly better than the 
incidental learning group (73% v. 44% correct).  
Hamrick and Rebuschat also asked participants to assess their confidence that 
their responses were correct on  a scale from 50 (pure guess) to 100 (absolutely sure). 
Confidence ratings in the intentional group (mean 81) were significantly higher than 
that incidental group (mean 61). Moreover, the intentional group’s confidence ratings 
correlated with accuracy (r=.77, p <.05), while those of the incidental group did not 
(r=.45, p > .05). Crucially, in both groups, performance was above chance even when 
participants claimed to be guessing: even when confidence ratings equalled 50, 
participants in the incidental learning group chose the correct response 34% of the 
time, while those in the intentional group were 45% correct.  
 While these results are suggestive, it is not clear whether the knowledge 
acquired by the participants in the Hamrick and Rebuschat experiment can be 
described as lexical knowledge. The problem is that, in the real world, most words are 
not acquired simply by hearing a label in the presence of a referent, even in the early 
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stages of language acquisition. Although parents often name objects for a child, words 
for actions, for example, rarely coincide with their labels: they typically occur either 
before or after (cf. eat your peas; he ran away; see also Gillette et al. 1999; 
Tomasello and Kruger 1992). A number of experimental studies have demonstrated 
that we learn a word when we infer that the speaker (or writer) who used it wanted to 
refer to some object, process or relationship that we are able to identify. Even young 
children are able to use complex social cues to determine the correct referent, and the 
referent need not be present when the word is produced (Tomasello and Barton 1994; 
Tomasello 2003); conversely, children do not acquire a word when they hear it 
spoken by a disembodied voice in the presence of a potential referent (Baldwin et al. 
1996). In other words, vocabulary knowledge is not merely associative knowledge, 
and thus it is not clear what the Hamrick and Rebuschat (2012, 2014) studies tell us 
about vocabulary learning.   
 In this paper, I argue that word knowledge can be implicit in the early stages 
of word learning, that is to say, before it becomes well entrenched – in other words, 
that weakly entrenched lexical knowledge is not accessible to consciousness. To 
demonstrate this, I describe an experiment testing native speakers’ comprehension of 
words which they are likely to have experienced in naturalistic settings, but very 
infrequently, and thus any knowledge that they may have acquired is likely to be 
poorly entrenched. The prediction is that even when speakers claim they do not know 
the words, they will perform above chance on an objective test tapping their 
knowledge. 
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2. Method 
 
2.1. Materials 
 
The instrument used in this study was partly based on Nation and Beglar’s (2007) 
Vocabulary Size Test. The VST consists of 140 items divided into 14 levels of 
difficulty. Level 1 contains 10 items sampled from the thousand most frequent “word 
families” in the British National Corpus; level 2 contains items sampled from the 
second thousand most frequent families, and so on. Each test word is presented in a 
short non-defining context  and followed by four simple definitions, as in example 
(1). Note that the distractors describe concepts which are very different from the 
target word; hence participants are able to choose the correct definition even if they 
have only a very rudimentary knowledge of the word’s meaning.  
 
(1) hessian: She bought some hessian.    
a. oily pinkish fish    
b. stuff that produces a happy state of mind  
c. coarse cloth    
d. strong-tasting root for flavouring food  
 
The initial test consisting of all items from levels 11 to 14 of the VST was piloted 
with a group of 29 undergraduates. The pilot study revealed that some of the original 
items were too easy (i.e., virtually all respondents selected the correct definition), 
while others were too difficult; these items were replaced with new words (see 
below). In addition, an analysis of the responses revealed some systematic errors 
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which were probably attributable to the wording of the definitions. The VST was 
developed to measure the vocabulary size of second language learners, and hence the 
defining vocabulary is very restricted, which results in some rather unnatural 
definitions which some respondents found misleading. Since participants in this study 
were university students who were native speakers, these were replaced with more 
precise definitions: for instance, the definition of weir (“thing built across a river to 
control the water”) was changed to “dam built across a river to control the water”; and 
definition of didactic (“tries hard to teach something”) was changed to “intended to 
teach a moral lesson”.  
 The final test (see appendix) consisted of 8 original items from the VST, 12 
items based on the VST but with modified definitions, and 15 new items of 
comparable level of difficulty following the same format. The mean frequency of the 
target words in the British National Corpus was 1.4 per million. In addition, five 
medium frequency words (yoga, mumble, bristle, haunted, and strangle; mean BNC 
frequency 5.3) which all educated native speakers are expected to know were used as 
control items; these were taken from lower levels of the VST. The self-evaluation task 
(see below) also included five pseudoword controls (cladon, fenculate, mockle, 
predolic, and spentive).  
The test consisted of two parts. Part 1 was a self evaluation task containing 45 
items (35 target words, 5 real controls, and 5 pseudowords). Each item consisted of a 
sentence containing the target word (with the target word printed in boldface). For 
each word, participants were asked to give one of the following responses: 
 Y = Yes, I know what the word means. 
 ?  = I’ve got a hunch, but I’m not sure. 
 N = I’ve got no idea.  
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Part 2 was a traditional multiple choice test comprising 40 items (the 35 target items 
and 5 real controls). Each item consisted of a sentence containing the target word 
(with the target word printed in boldface) followed by four definitions. Participants 
were asked to choose what they thought was the correct answer, and to guess when 
they were not sure. They were also asked not to refer back to part 1 when they were 
completing part 2.  
  The test items were arranged in random order. Four different randomizations 
were used, with approximately a quarter of the participants being tested with each 
version. To discourage participants going back to part 1 to change their answers, 
different random orders were used in parts 1 and 2. One complete version of the test, 
including instructions, is provided in the appendix. 
 
2.2. Participants and procedure  
 
75 second year undergraduates studying English Literature participated in the study; 
they were all were native speakers of English. Participants were tested in a lecture 
room after a lecture, and took about 12 minutes to complete the test.  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Control items  
 
Control items in the self evaluation task were scored as follows: real words were 
scored as correct if the participant said s/he knew what they meant; pseudowords were 
scored as correct if the participant said s/he did not know what they meant; all “not 
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sure” responses were scored as incorrect. 11 participants obtained scores of 7 or 
below on the control items and were deemed not to have engaged with the task and 
hence excluded; one participant was excluded because s/he did not complete the task. 
The remaining 63 participants were entered into the analysis.  
  The participants correctly identified 100% of the real control words on the 
self-evaluation task, and correctly rejected 83% of the pseudowords. Thus, overall 
performance on control items was 91%. Participants chose the correct definition of 
the control items 98% of the time. These results suggest that the judgments collected 
in the study were generally reliable, although participants showed a slight tendency to 
overestimate their knowledge. Thus, we can be confident that when participants 
reported that they had “no idea” what a word meant, they really had no conscious 
knowledge, rather than simply adopting a conservative attitude in their estimates.  
 
3.2. Test items 
 
On average, participants claimed to know 51% of the test items, were unsure about 
12%, and did not know 37%. They scored 63% correct on the multiple choice test (SD 
12, range 29-89%). There was a moderately strong correlation (r=.54, p<.001) 
between vocabulary size as measured by the self-evaluation and multiple choice tests, 
i.e., the number of items identified as “known” in part 1 and the number of correct 
responses in part 2.  
 To compare performance on the three categories of words, each participant’s 
responses on the multiple choice test were divided into “known”, “possibly known”, 
and “unknown”, depending on their responses on the self-evaluation task. The results, 
converted into percentages, are presented in table 1.  
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Table 1: Proportion of correct responses as a function of self-evaluated knowledge 
Category Mean
 
SD 
Known 84 11 
Possibly known 46 28 
Unknown 45 20 
 
On average, participants chose the correct definition on the multiple choice test for 
84% of the words that they claimed to know. This is significantly lower (t(62)=5.05, 
p<0.001) than their scores on the control words, which confirms that they tended to 
overestimate their knowledge. They scored 46% on words they were not sure about, 
and 45% of the words they claimed they didn’t know. Both of these scores are 
significantly lower than the scores for known words: for possibly known v. known, 
t(56)=10.97; for unknown v. known, t(62)=14.14. They were also significantly above 
chance (i.e., 25%): for unknown words, t(62)=8.07, p<0.001; for possibly known 
words: t(56)=5.75, p<0.001. Performance on unknown and possibly known words 
was not significantly different: t(56)=0.59, p=.557.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
As predicted, participants’ performance on words they claimed they didn’t know was 
above chance (45% correct). This is similar to the performance observed in the 
Hamrick and Rebuchat (2012) pseudoword learning study. The test items in the 
experiment described here, however, were real English words, acquired in the normal 
way, i.e., predominantly through incidental exposure in texts (Dąbrowska 2009), 
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although of course some of the words may have been learned explicitly, or even 
taught.  
These results are compatible with two interpretations. First, applying Dienes’ 
(Dienes et al. 1995; Dienes 2008) criteria, we may note that while the zero correlation 
criterion suggests that participants had explicit knowledge of the target words (since 
performance on known words was considerably higher), the guessing criterion 
indicates that their knowledge was at least partly implicit (since participants 
performed considerably better than chance even when they claimed to be guessing). 
Thus, we could conclude that participants’ knowledge was partly implicit and partly 
explicit. This is how Hamrick and Rebuschat interpreted their results, arguing that in 
their study, participants in the intentional learning condition acquired both implicit 
and explicit knowledge, since they performed above chance even when they claimed 
to be guessing, but also there was a significant relationship between their  confidence 
ratings and accuracy (r=.77, p<.05). The incidental group, on the other hand 
performed above chance even when they claimed to be guessing (thus demonstrating 
implicit knowledge), but showed no significant correlation between accuracy and 
confidence in their answer (r=.45, p>.05). Note, however, the failure to find a 
significant correlation was most likely due to lack of power: with only 15 participant 
and a correlation coefficient of .45, the likelihood of finding a significant correlation 
if there is one is only .38. Performance in the incidental learning condition (44%) was 
much lower than when learning was intentional (73%), so there is simply not enough 
variability in scores for a large correlation to arise.  
 Thus, we cannot conclude that the knowledge acquired by the two groups 
differed in kind, just as there is no evidence that, in the study described here, 
participants’ knowledge of the items they identified as “known”, “possibly known” 
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and “unknown” was different. An alternative interpretation would be that all 
knowledge of word meaning is represented in the same format – in other words, that 
the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge is a matter of degree, at least 
for vocabulary knowledge. Initial representations may be “implicit” in the sense that 
they are too weak to be accessible to consciousness, and gradually become “explicit” 
as they are strengthened through repeated exposure (cf. Cleeremans 2006).2  On this 
account, participants’ judgments would be a function of a words’ entrenchment.3  
 Several lines of evidence seem to argue in favour of the second possibility. 
First, both kinds of knowledge can be acquired incidentally, and both are sensitive to 
frequency in the input  (Hamrick and Rebuschat 2014). Furthermore, in studies which 
use the guessing criterion to establish the existence of implicit knowledge, the 
observed levels of performance are above chance, but relatively low, of the order of 
35-45% correct on four-alternative forced-choice tasks (see, for example, Hamrick 
and Rebuschat 2014 and the results presented above), and 60-65% correct on many 
artificial grammar learning tasks (e.g. Rebuschat and Williams 2009; Redington and 
Chater 1996, Scott and Dienes 2010), where participants are required to perform a 
two-alternative forced-choice task (grammatical v. ungrammatical), and hence chance 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that it is possible to acquire an explicit representation of a 
word’s meaning with just one exposure. This has been demonstrated in a number of 
“fast mapping” studies (Carey 1978, Dickinson 1984, Heibeck and Markman 1987, 
Houston-Price et al. 2005, Markson and Bloom 1997). Most fast-mapping studies, 
however, involve manipulating the learner’s attention and repetition. Without such 
support, there is little long-term retention (cf. Vlach and Sandhofer 2012). 
3
 Thus, some types of implicit knowledge can be considered “pre-explicit”. Note, 
however, that this does not apply to all types of implicit memory: in particular, it does 
not apply to procedural memory. In fact, procedural memory can in some cases at 
least be regarded as “post-explicit”, in the sense that lack of awareness may be a 
consequence of proceduralization (cf. Cleeremans 2006).  
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performance is 50%.4 It  seems that, as performance increases with gradual exposure, 
so do confidence judgements.5 
 The second account makes the following prediction: if the incidental learning 
group are given additional exposure, both confidence ratings and accuracy will rise, 
and a significant relationship between the two will emerge. Until an experiment 
testing this prediction is conducted, we cannot decide conclusively between the two 
explanations. However, whatever the relationship between implicit and explicit 
knowledge, it is clear that knowledge of word meaning can be (at least partly) 
implicit. It seems that the mental lexicon, like other areas of cognition, involves a 
coalition of mental processes – some implicit, and some explicit.  
 
                                                 
4
 Note that these levels of performance are equivalent once we take the probability of 
producing the correct response by chance into account. We can correct for guessing 
by using the following formula: corrected score = (% correct - % chance)/(100 - % 
chance). Applying this correction, a score of 45% on a four-alternative forced choice 
task becomes 26%, while a score of 65% on a two-alterative test is equivalent to 30%. 
5
 An anonymous referee points out that while it is true that, in general, performance is 
better when participants are more confident, the Scott and Dienes (2010) study found 
that participants performed above chance when they claimed they chose the response 
randomly and at chance when they reported that they relied on intuition, familiarity, 
rules or recollection. Although Scott and Dienes did not assess confidence directly, it 
is reasonable to assume that they would be more confident in the latter case. Note, 
however, that this finding does not undermine the argument presented here, since the 
chance performance when they were relying in intuition, rules, etc., shows that 
whatever generalizations they were relying on were incorrect. 
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Appendix: Testing materials 
 
Part 1. For each of the words below, indicate whether you know it: 
 Y = Yes, I know what the word means 
 ?  = I’ve got a hunch, but I’m not sure 
 N = I’ve got no idea 
 
Put your answer in the box beside the sentence. Please be sure to answer all questions.  
 
1 affidavit: He needs an affidavit.   
2 serrated: It had a serrated edge.   
3 mockle: We mockled out of the house.  
4 aperitif: She had an aperitif.     
5 humdrum: He lived a humdrum life.  
6 lintel: He painted the lintel.      
7 mirth: She tried to control her mirth.  
8 querulous: He was very querulous.  
9 fenculate: She was fenculated.   
10 atoll: The atoll was beautiful.    
11 bawdy: It was very bawdy.    
12 weir: We looked at the weir.     
13 rue: He will rue the day.  
14 locust: There were hundreds of locusts.     
15 mumble: He started to mumble.    
16 impale: He nearly got impaled.   
17 trill: He practised the trill.      
18 cladon: He needs a new cladon.  
19 ubiquitous: These plants are ubiquitous.     
20 gauche: He was gauche.        
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21 spentive: He was very spentive.  
22 didactic: The story is very didactic.    
23 marsupial: It is a marsupial.    
24 augur: It augured well.      
25 predolic: It is predolic.  
26 strangle: He strangled her.    
27 charlatan: He is a charlatan.   
28 lugubrious: He was a lugubrious fellow.   
29 malinger: She’s not malingering.  
30 pristine: The beach was pristine.   
31 rouble: He had a lot of roubles.   
32 refectory: We met in the refectory.    
33 coven: She is the leader of a coven.     
34 squawk: The bird squawked.  
35 yoga: She has started yoga.   
36 myopic: He is myopic.  
37 dally: Stop dallying!  
38 hessian: She bought some hessian.     
39 nebulous: It’s a nebulous concept.   
40 emir: We saw the emir.     
41 canonical: These are canonical examples.     
42 haunt: The house is haunted.      
43 alum: This contains alum.       
44 bristle: The bristles are too hard.    
45 mollify: They tried to mollify her.  
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Part 2.  Choose the word or expression (A, B, C or D) that is most similar in meaning 
to the word in boldface. Put your answer in the box beside the question. IF YOU 
DON’T KNOW, GUESS.  Be sure to choose just 1 answer in each set. PLEASE DO 
NOT GO BACK TO PART 1. 
 
1 nebulous: It’s a nebulous concept.  
A. difficult to understand 
B. strange 
C. very old 
D. vague or ill-defined 
 
2 lugubrious: He was a lugubrious fellow.  
A. not very intelligent 
B. not very quick 
C. mournful or gloomy 
D. prone to illness 
 
3 atoll: The atoll was beautiful.  
A. a ring-like coral island and reef surrounding a lagoon 
B. work of art created by weaving pictures from fine thread  
C. small crown with many precious jewels  
D. a wide canyon  
 
4 ubiquitous: These plants are ubiquitous.    
A. are difficult to get rid of  
B. have long, strong roots  
C. are found nearly everywhere  
D. need a lot of water 
 
5 bawdy: It was very bawdy.   
A. strange and unpredictable  
B. enjoyable  
C. rushed  
D. humorously indecent 
 
6 emir: We saw the emir.    
A. bird with two long curved tail feathers   
B. woman who cares for other people’s children in Eastern countries  
C. a Middle Eastern ruler  
D. a large house 
 
7 affidavit: He needs an affidavit. 
A. young female companion 
B. written statement confirmed by oath  
C. artist’s board for mixing paints 
D. heavy iron pole with a curved end  
 
8 humdrum: He lived a humdrum life. 
A. full of adventures 
B. lacking variety or excitement  
C. extraordinary 
D. filled with sorrow and sadness 
 
9 malinger: She’s not malingering. 
A. joking 
B. pretending to be ill 
C. telling untrue stories 
D. preparing to go out 
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10 weir: We looked at the weir.   
A. table or block used for ritual sacrifices 
B. wet and muddy place with water plants    
C. old metal musical instrument played by blowing   
D. dam built across a river to control the water   
 
11 hessian: She bought some hessian.   
A. oily pinkish fish    
B. stuff that produces a happy state of mind  
C. coarse cloth    
D. strong-tasting root for flavouring food  
 
12 gauche: He was gauche.  
A. talkative  
B. flexible  
C. awkward  
D. determined        
 
13 querulous: He was very querulous. 
A. maniacal  
B. curious  
C. devote  
D. complaining 
 
14 marsupial: It is a marsupial.   
A. an animal with hard feet  
B. a plant that grows for several years 
C. something that brings good luck 
D. an animal that carries its young in a pouch on its belly 
 
15 trill: He practised the trill.    
A. a rapid alternation of two musical tones 
B. type of stringed instrument  
C. way of throwing a ball  
D. dance step of turning round very fast on the toes    
 
16 alum: This contains alum.    
A. a poisonous substance from a common plant    
B. a soft material made of artificial threads  
C. fermented milk 
D. a chemical compound used in dying and for medicinal purposes   
 
17 bristle: The bristles are too hard.   
A. questions  
B. short stiff hairs  
C. folding beds    
D. bottoms of the shoes  
 
18 pristine: The beach was pristine.  
A. very small  
B. pebbly 
C. unspoiled 
D. unremarkable 
 
19 dally: Stop dallying! 
A. wasting time 
B. worrying 
C. jumping up and down 
D. making rude remarks 
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20 rouble: He had a lot of roubles. 
A. very precious red stones  
B. distant members of his family  
C. Russian currency  
D. moral or other difficulties in the mind  
 
21 charlatan: He is a charlatan. 
A. a skilled craftsman 
B. a person falsely claiming to have special knowledge or skill  
C. a medieval scholar  
D. a person who tries to help others  
 
22 yoga: She has started yoga.    
A. handwork done by knotting thread  
B. a form of exercise for the body and mind  
C. a children’s game  
D. a type of dance from eastern countries  
 
23 rue: He will rue the day. 
A. celebrate 
B. remember 
C. regret 
D. forget 
 
24 squawk: The bird squawked. 
A. became ill 
B. turned suddenly 
C. made a harsh noise 
D. flew away 
 
25 aperitif: She had an aperitif.   
A. a long chair for lying on with just one place to rest an arm   
B. a private singing teacher 
C. a large hat with feathers  
D. a drink taken before a meal  
 
26 haunt: The house is haunted.    
A. full of ornaments  
B. rented  
C. empty    
D. full of ghosts      
 
27 refectory: We met in the refectory.   
A. a communal dining hall  
B. office where legal papers can be signed  
C. room for several people to sleep in  
D. room in the back of a house 
 
28 augur: It augured well.    
A. it was a good omen 
B. agreed  
C. had a colour that looked good with something else    
D. rang with a clear, beautiful sound  
 
29 serrated: It had a serrated edge. 
A. sharp 
B. blunt 
C. slightly curved 
D. notched like a saw  
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30 didactic: The story is very didactic.  
A. is intended to teach a moral lesson 
B. is very difficult to believe  
C. deals with exciting actions  
D. is long and complicated  
 
31 impale: He nearly got impaled. 
A. charged with a serious offence  
B. put in prison    
C. stuck through with a sharp instrument  
D. involved in a dispute  
 
32 mollify: They tried to mollify her. 
A. make her feel less angry or upset 
B. persuade her to change her mind 
C. dress her very attractively  
D. persuade her to eat more 
 
33 locust: There were hundreds of locusts.    
A. unpaid helpers   
B. insects with wings  
C. people who exercise a lot 
D. brightly coloured wild flowers  
 
34 coven: She is the leader of a coven.   
A. a small singing group  
B. a business that is owned by the workers  
C. a group or gathering of witches 
D. a group of women who follow a strict religious life   
 
35 mirth: She tried to control her mirth. 
A. anger 
B. amusement 
C. jealousy 
D. fear 
 
36 strangle: He strangled her.    
A. killed her by squeezing her throat  
B. gave her all the things she wanted  
C. took her away by force  
D. admired her greatly   
 
37 canonical: These are canonical examples.   
A. examples which break the usual rules  
B. examples taken from a religious book  
C. regular and widely accepted examples  
D. examples discovered very recently  
 
38 lintel: He painted the lintel.    
A. beam across the top of a door or window  
B. small boat used for getting to land from a big boat  
C. beautiful tree with spreading branches and green fruit 
D. board which shows the scene in a theatre  
 
39 myopic: He is myopic. 
A. short-sighted 
B. imaginative 
C. very tall and slim 
D. confused 
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40 mumble: He started to mumble.  
A. think deeply  
B. shake uncontrollably    
C. stay further behind the others  
D. speak in an unclear way   
 
 
One last question: Is English your native language? Yes/No (Circle one.) 
Please check that you have answered all questions. If you are not sure, guess.  
THANK YOU! 
 
